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I. INTRODUCTION

It is well settled that the right to make decisions concerning
the upbringing of one's children is a fundamental right deserving the
utmost
constitutional
protection
from
unreasonable
state
1
interference. It has also become increasingly well settled over the
past twenty-five years that this right is not automatically and
permanently guaranteed by biology. Rather, parental stature
encompasses both "rights and responsibilities," and the rights are only
2
guaranteed to a parent who has assumed parental responsibilities.
Why then is a responsible custodial parent subject to state
interference with his or her parental decisions in the interest of
guaranteeing an absent parent, who has abandoned his or her child
financially, physically, and emotionally, permanent parental rights?
Consider David. 3 David is a divorced single father of an eightyear-old boy. Shortly after David and his wife divorced, his ex-wife
left their son Joel in David's custody and moved out of state. Joel was
barely one year old at the time. Despite court orders and David's
efforts, Joel's mother has failed to pay child support and has made no
1.
In fact, it appears that this interest was the first unlisted individual right to be
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)
(citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) as the first case in which parental rights were
recognized as a fundamental liberty protected by the constitution); see also Emily Buss,
"Parental"Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 655 (2002) ("Among the contemporary claims for protected
liberty interests, none has received more widespread and consistent endorsement than a parent's
'fundamental right' to control the upbringing of her children.").
2.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393-94 (1979) (affording a biological father
constitutional protection of his parental rights where he has taken responsibility for his
children); Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (holding that a biological father has no
constitutionally protected rights where he has not assumed any responsibility for the child).
3.
David's story is based on a real life story. However, the names have been changed to
protect the privacy of those involved.
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attempts to visit or communicate with Joel for over six years. At
various periods in Joel's life, David has not even possessed a means to
contact Joel's mother. While battling the natural obstacles that
accompany being a single parent, David is under a court order to
notify Joel's mother and the court of any changes in his residence,
4
changes in Joel's school, or substantial medical events in Joel's life.
On two occasions, David has had to petition the court for permission to
5
relocate out of state.
Now David waits, knowing that the day may come when Joel's
6
mother decides that she wants to reassert her rights to visitation.
This idea scares David as a parent, not because he selfishly wants to
keep Joel away from his mother, but because he knows that neither he
nor Joel would have any control over the terms of reestablished
contact, nor would they be able to prevent Joel's mother from
subsequently ceasing contact and disappearing once again.7 If this
were to occur, David would be left to explain and comfort and
counteract the emotional damage once again. David also lives with
uncertainty because he knows that he cannot designate a permanent
guardian to raise Joel in the event of his death. Regardless of any

4.
These provisions were included in David's original decree of dissolution of marriage,
pursuant to the family court's broad discretion under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (West
2002).
5.
This requirement was also included in the original dissolution decree. Each of the
jurisdictions to which David has been subject has similar requirements for a custodial parent to
seek court authorization before relocating to another state and places the burden on the
custodial parent to show that the move is in the child's best interest. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-10-129 (1)(a)(I); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.5 (Michie 2000); Rice v. Rice, 517 S.E.2d 220, 222
(S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the presumption against allowing custodial parent to remove
child from state); Goodhand v. Kildoo, 560 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the
custodial parent must show that out-of-state move independently benefits the child).
6.
All of the jurisdictions to which David has been subject also have strong presumptions
that regular and continuous visitation with a natural parent is in the child's best interests. See
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1) (declaring that it is in the best interests of the child to
encourage frequent and continuing contacts with both parents); § 14-10-129(1)(b) (requiring a
showing of endangerment for restriction of a natural parent's presumed visitation rights); In re
Marriage of Plummer, 709 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a trial court's
discretion in determining parent-child visitation "must be exercised in consonance with the
public policy 'to encourage frequent and continuing contact between each parent and the minor
child"'); Venable v. Venable, 254 S.E.2d 309, 310 (S.C. 1979) (holding that the court's power to
absolutely deny visitation should be used sparingly and only in the extreme case); Kogon v.
Ulerick, 405 S.E.2d 441, 442 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) ("Except under unusual circumstances, a child's
best interests are served by maintaining close ties between him and his noncustodial parent.").
7.
See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of a noncustodial parent's ongoing right to
visitation, regardless of prolonged absence, and a custodial parent's limited right to object or
restrict such visitation; see infra note 122 and accompanying text for the proposition that neither
the child nor the custodial parent have any right to prevent the noncustodial parent from ceasing
contact or disappearing from the child's life.
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testamentary provisions in David's will, the court system would likely
award custody of Joel to Joel's mother upon David's death. 8
So, why is it that, despite her complete disregard for court
orders and her natural duties as a parent, Joel's mother retains
permanent parental rights? Why is the burden left on David, the
responsible parent, to continue to comply with court orders, costing
him precious time and money? Why does David remain legally
obligated to provide information to a woman who does not keep the
father and caretaker of her child informed of her whereabouts? Why
isn't David considered the best person to decide who should have
contact with his son and who would best raise his son in his absence?
These are all good questions, for which, unfortunately, the law
provides no answers.
State statutes generally provide three ways in which a
biological parent's rights can be terminated against his or her will:
state-initiated dependency and neglect actions, general adoptions, and
stepparent adoptions. 9 State-initiated actions are based on a state's
interest in protecting children from dangerous home situations. 10
While all states allow such actions after parental abandonment for as
little as three months, 1 such relief is unavailable where the child has
been abandoned by only one parent and is in the suitable care of the
12
other natural parent because the state has no immediate interest.
General adoptions are also allowed to proceed over the objections of
one or both parents where a child has been abandoned for as little as

8.
Colorado has recently replaced the presumption of reverting custody to the surviving
natural parent to a general best interest of the child standard. See In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892
P.2d 246, 254-55 (Colo. 1995) (overruling the presumption in favor of the natural parent).
However, the other two states that are most likely to exercise jurisdiction in the event of David's
death still employ a presumption in favor of the surviving parent. See, e.g., Dodge v. Dodge, 505
S.E.2d 344, 348 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (acknowledging the rebuttable presumption that custody
automatically reverts to the surviving parent when the custodial parent dies); Bailes v. Sours,
340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986) (acknowledging the strong presumption in favor of reverting
custody to the surviving natural parent).
9.
See infra notes 40, 49, 60 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Haugaard & Rosemary J. Avery, Termination of ParentalRights to
Free Children for Adoption, in CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 131, 132-33 (Bette L.

Bottoms et al. eds., 2002).
11. See infra notes 40, 45-47 and accompanying text.
12. Because termination proceedings require the expenditure of limited state resources,
states are only compelled to bring termination suits when the child is in immediate need of a safe
and stable home; states have no immediate interest in terminating an absent parent's rights
where the child is currently in the safe and suitable care of the present parent. See, e.g., In re
Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to intervene where the
child is not "abused, neglected, or dependent" and the custodial parent "presently provides a
loving and comfortable home for her"); Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10, at 137-39.
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three months. 13 Although the plain language of many statutes allows
a biological parent to adopt his or her own child, states have
disallowed such adoptions when a legal parent-child relationship
already exists. 14 Stepparent adoption statutes also allow adoptions
over a noncustodial parent's objections after three or more months of
abandonment.'6 By definition, however, such adoptions require a new
spouse.
None of these means for termination of parental rights is
applicable to David's situation. This is not because David is any less
suitable than the individuals who would assume care of a child at the
conclusion of one of these proceedings,' 6 nor is it because the extent
and length of parental abandonment is any less than that required in
any of these proceedings. 17 David's situation simply does not fit into
the statutory categories.
The purpose of this Note is to identify the inconsistency and
inequality present in existing parental rights laws, which prevent a
natural parent from terminating the other natural parent's rights
after prolonged abandonment. The situation addressed by this Note is
not the typical custody situation in which parents compete for superior
rights, nor is it the situation in which one parent, angered by the
other parent's failure to pay child support or failure to show up on
time for visitation, vindictively seeks to cut off the other parent's
rights. The situation contemplated is the extreme, but not uncommon,
13. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 81-83.
15. See infra notes 56, 60, 61 and accompanying text.
16. David, a young, loving, responsible, and financially sound parent, would certainly meet
the common requirements set forth for adoptive parents. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3(a)
(1999) ("Any adult person ... financially, physically, and mentally able to have permanent
custody of the child"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(1) (Michie 1998) ("[T]he petitioners are of
good moral character, of reputable standing in the community and of ability to properly maintain
and educate the child"); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.350 (2001) ("[T]he petitioner is of sufficient ability
to bring up the child and furnish suitable nurture and education"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14
(2000) (same language as Oregon statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-120(a)(10)-(11) (2001) ("That
the petitioners are fit persons to have the care and custody of the child ... [and] are financially
able to provide for the child"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-701(a)(3) (Michie 2001) ("That the
petitioner is, or the petitioners are, fit persons to adopt the child"). For critiques of other child
placements following terminations, see, for example, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789-90
n.15 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); MARK HARDIN & ROBERT LANCOUR, EARLY TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE STATUTORY GROUNDS 22 (1996); THEODORE J.
STEIN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAW 97-98 (rev. ed. 1998); Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10, at
134; and Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental Rights
TerminationProceedings,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 413-14 (1996).
17. Termination and adoption statutes commonly allow for termination of parental rights
after six months of a parent's failure to support, visit, or communicate with the child. See infra
notes 47, 57. In David's case, the abandonment has involved failure to support, visit, and
communicate and has lasted for more than six years.
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case in which an absent parent has voluntarily removed himself or
herself from the child's life, failing to support, visit, talk to, send cards
to, check up on, keep apprised of the location of, or in any other way
attempt to maintain a relationship with his or her child.18 One parent
goes, and the other parent stays. This Note uses the term "absent
parent" to refer a parent who is, in every way, absent from the child's
life. The term "present parent" is used to refer to the parent who
stays, taking on every responsibility of raising the child, yet retaining
only the title and legal rights of "custodian."' 9
To understand the legal status currently afforded to both
absent and present parents, it is necessary to explore the current laws
concerning parental rights, termination of parental rights, and child
custody. Part II of this Note sets forth the legal nature of parental
rights, the constitutional protection afforded to them, and the
circumstances under which they can be lost. Part III identifies and
analyzes the current lack of legal means by which a present parent
can terminate the parental rights of an absent parent. This Part also
identifies the limitations on the legal status of "custodian" and

18. For general discussion regarding the frequency with which noncustodial parents become
absent from their children's lives, see, for example, SHOSHANA ALEXANDER, IN PRAISE OF SINGLE
PARENTS 286 (1994) ("An astounding percentage of noncustodial parents take little or no
emotional or financial responsibility for their children."); NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF
SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 62 (1997) (noting that many fathers without custody rights abandon
their relationship with their children within two years of the divorce); GEOFFREY L. GREIF, OUT
OF TOUCH: WHEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN LOSE CONTACT AFTER DIVORCE 6 (1997) (citing 1996
Census Bureau statistics indicating that forty-seven percent of noncustodial fathers and thirty
percent of noncustodial mothers do not visit their children); MICHAEL WHEELER, DIVIDED
CHILDREN 57 (1980) (citing research (current in 1980) that revealed, of noncustodial fathers, ten
percent had no visitation with their children, and another twenty percent had only erratic
visitation); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., & Kathleen Mullan Harris, The DisappearingAmerican
Father?: Divorce and the Waning Significance of Biological Parenthood, in THE CHANGING
AMERICAN FAMILY 197, 198 (Scott J. South & Stewart E. Tolnay eds., 1992) ("A number of recent
studies seem to indicate that a substantial and growing fraction of nonresidential fathers spend
little time with their biological offspring or offer them much in the way of material or emotional
assistance."); and Christine Winquist Nord & Nicholas Zill, Non-Custodial Parents'Participation
in Their Children's Lives: Evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Participation(Aug.
14, 1996), available at http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/SIPP/NONCUSP1.HTM (citing 1990 SIPP
research that showed 31.7 of noncustodial fathers have not spent time with their children in the
past 12 months). For cases involving true absent parents, see, for example, In re Monahan, 281
A.2d 620, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); and Panter v. Ash, 33 P.3d 1028, 1029-30 (Or. Ct. App.
2001).

While much of this research focuses on noncustodial, absent fathers, this Note endorses a
gender-neutral approach to the present parent/absent parent dichotomy. It may be more
common for present parents to be mothers, but there are a significant number of present fathers,
who, like David, have the same concerns, problems, and needs as present mothers. The gender
of the parents is completely irrelevant to the concerns addressed by this Note, and any gender
bias contained in the sources relied upon is not endorsed by the author.
19. See infra Part III.B.
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identifies some of the illogical and inconsistent outcomes that result
from the current system. Part IV proposes that the law afford present
parents an avenue by which they can terminate an absent parent's
parental rights in the case of prolonged abandonment. This Part
addresses many of the arguments for and against allowing such an
action and discusses specific elements that would be appropriate.
II.

PARENTAL RIGHTS AS A COUNTERPART TO PARENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES

A. ConstitutionalProtectionof ParentalRights
1. Parental Rights as a Fundamental Liberty Protected by the
Constitution
As early as 1923, the United States Supreme Court held that a
parent's right to direct the upbringing of one's children is a
fundamental liberty protected by the Constitution. 20 Specifically, "the
custody, care, and nurture of the child resides first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."21 "[S]o long as a
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for the state to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's
children." 22 If the state does interfere with this right, it must have a
compelling reason to do so, and it must afford parents adequate due
23
process protection.
Over the years, the Court has interpreted parental rights
broadly to encompass all of the daily decisions involved in the
upbringing of one's children. 24 Parents have the right to determine

20. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 414 (1979);
Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Validity of State Statute Providing for Termination of
ParentalRights, 22 A.L.R. 4th 774, § 2(a) (1983).
21. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
22. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304
(1993)).
23. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982); Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
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aspects of their children's lives such as education, 25 religion, 26 and
Even with respect to adolescent children,
medical treatment.2 7
parents retain the right to be involved in and to counsel their children
in important life decisions. 28 Underlying these rights and decisional
freedoms is the presumption that parents are in the best position to
29
know what is in the best interests of their children.
Most recently, the Supreme Court held that parental rights
include the right to decide who may have contact or visitation with
one's children. 30 In Troxel v. Granville, the Court reversed a visitation
order that granted paternal grandparents visitation with their two
grandchildren over the mother's objection.3 1 Although the children
had an ongoing, consistent relationship with their grandparents, the
Court found that the natural mother's parental rights had been
infringed upon when the lower court failed to afford her the
"presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children." 32 The Court emphasized that "the Due Process Clause does
not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to
make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a
'better' decision could be made." 33 Although Troxel was the first
decision to directly address court-ordered visitation as an undue state
interference, the decision flows quite logically from what was held
nearly eight decades before: parental rights deserve the utmost
34
Fourteenth Amendment protection from state interference.
2. Losing Constitutional Protection
Constitutional protection of parental rights, however, is not
automatically guaranteed by biology. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "the rights of the parents are a counterpart
of the responsibilities they have assumed."35 Accordingly, the Court

25. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
26. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)
27. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 548, 604 (1979).
28. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981).
29. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000); Parham,442 U.S. at 604.
30. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
31. The Supreme Court affirmed the Washington appellate court's reversal of the
Washington Superior Court's order granting visitation to the grandparents. Id. at 61-63.
32. Id. at 60-61, 68-70.
33. Id. at 72.73.
34. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
35. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983); see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 397 (1979) ("Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between
parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.").
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has declined to extend Fourteenth Amendment protections to natural
36
parents who have not assumed adequate parental responsibilities.
Where natural parents have failed to financially support their
children, regularly communicate with their children, or establish
substantial relationships with their children, the Court has refused to
extend heightened substantive due process, procedural due process, or
equal treatment protection.3 7 Thus, while present parents, who have
assumed a natural parental role and natural parental responsibility,
are entitled to the utmost constitutional protection of their parental
rights, absent parents, who have failed to assume a natural parental
role or natural parental responsibility, are not entitled to the same
constitutional protection of their parental rights.
B. Legal Means To Terminate ParentalRights
Paralleling the Supreme Court's recognition that parental
rights are a counterpart to the responsibilities a parent assumes,
every state permits a court to permanently terminate a biological
parent's rights where the parent has failed to assume adequate
parental responsibilities.3 8 Specifically, every state allows for parental
rights to be terminated through state-initiated dependency and
neglect proceedings, through general adoptions, or through stepparent
39
adoptions.
1. Termination by the State
Every state's statutory scheme for state termination of
parental rights includes a provision for involuntary termination upon
a parent's failure to assume adequate parental responsibility. 40 Some
36.
37.
38.

See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-63; Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978).
See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 267-68; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
See infra Part III.B.1-3.

39.

See infra notes 40, 49, 60.

40.

See ALA. CODE § 26-18-5, -7 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011, .013, .088 (Michie 2000);

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(a), -533(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-

303(2), -341(b)(3) (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7802, 7822, 7840 (West 1994); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-3-604 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-715, -717 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 13, §§ 1103, 1104 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.806, .811 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 1511-94 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-61 (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-2005 (Michie
2001); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-21 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4 (Michie
1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583 (2000); KY. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 625.090, .100 (Michie 1999); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. arts. 1004, 1015, 1037 (West
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4052, 4055 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 3-803, -809 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 24, 29 (West 2003); MICH. COMP.

LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 93-15-103, -109 (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447 (West Supp. 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-
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states refer to such conduct as "abandonment," 41 some refer to it as
"desertion,"42 and some merely describe the behavior without
assigning a particular label. 43 Whatever the label given, however, a
parent's failure to maintain a relationship with, communicate with,
visit, or support one's child for a given period of time is uniformly
regarded as grounds for termination of parental rights. 44 Some states
allow for termination after as little as three months of such parental
conduct, 4 5 while others require up to one year. 46 Most often, states
allow for state-initiated termination of parental rights after six
months of a parent's failure to communicate with, visit, or support his
or her child. 47 Further, in calculating the length of time a parent has
abandoned his or her child, most statutes allow courts to disregard
"incidental" or "token" efforts made by a parent. 48 Thus, if a parent
3-423, -609 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 128.105, .110, .012
(Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-C:1, :4-:5, :12 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:2-18, -19 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-28, -29 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2003); N.Y.
JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 614 (McKinney 1999); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(b), (5) (McKinney
2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-1103, -1111 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20.02(1), -20, -20.1, -44
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.27, .353 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7003-4.7,
7006-1.1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419B-500, -506 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2511, 2512 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-768, 1572 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-21.2, -26, -27 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-1-102, -113, 37-1-147 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, .003 (Vernon 2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3a-312, -402, -404, -408 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, §§ 3-501, -504
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.34.132, .180 (West
1993 & Supp. 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-22-306, 49-3-1, 49.6-5b (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.415, .417, .427 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-309, -310 (Michie 2003).
41. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.013; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(1); ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-27-303(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-717; IDAHO CODE § 16-2005; IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8
(West 2001); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1015(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-408; WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.415(1).
42. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(1)(4).
43. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-61(b)(1)(C)-(D); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-423(3)(a)-(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-19; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a)(1); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504.
44. See supra note 40.
45. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(1)(a)(2).
46. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ii); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7822(a) (West 1994);
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 15-11-94(b)(4)(C)

(2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-61(b)(1)(C)-(D); IDAHO

CODE § 16-2005(a).
47. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.013 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(1)
(West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(2)(a)(2) (1999); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art.
1015(4) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(2)(a)(1) (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. §
211.447(4)(1) (West Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170C:5 (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1(A)(2)(c) (West Supp. 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2511; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-8A-27 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.180 (West 1993).
48. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 128.105 (Michie Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
170-C:5; OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.506 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(1) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN.
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has consistently failed to support, visit, or communicate with his or
her child, notwithstanding token efforts, the state can completely and
permanently terminate his or her parental rights.
2. Termination by Adoption
A second way in which every state allows for involuntary
termination of parental rights is by allowing adoption of the child over
a parent's objection where the parent has failed to assume adequate
parental responsibility. 49 All adoptions, whether the adopting parent
is a foster parent, a private party, or a relative, have the effect of
completely and permanently terminating the biological parents'
rights. 50 While adoptions generally require the consent of both
biological parents, every state allows an adoption to proceed over a
biological parent's objection where that parent has failed to fulfill his
or her parental responsibilities. 51 Some states achieve this effect by
authorizing adoptive parents to initiate termination of parental rights

§ 20-7-1572; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-407(1)(f) (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (Michie
2003).
49. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9 (Supp. 2002); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050 (Michie 2000); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-106, -531, -533; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-202, -207; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-717, -724 (West 1993); DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 908, 932, 1103; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.062, .064, .089, .102 (West 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-8-10 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-2; IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (Michie 2001
& Supp. 2003); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-8 (Michie
1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 600.3, 600A.5, 600A.8 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136 (1994);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.502 (Michie 1998); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. arts. 1015, 1193; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-204 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-312 (Supp. 2003);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.41, .45,
.51 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-7 (Supp. 2003); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 453.040 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 42-2-607 to -610 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43104; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 127.090, 128.105 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:6, C:5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-15, -18 (Michie 1995); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-1103(a)(7), 7B-1111, 48-3-603
(2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-06, -19 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (West 2000);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7503-2.1, 7505-2.1, -4.2 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.314, .324
(2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2511, 2714; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-7-5, -7; S.C. CODE ANN. §§
20-7-1572, -1695; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-4 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-102, 113, -117 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001, .010 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 783a-312, -408, 78-30-4.16; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, §§ 2-402, 3-504 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.21203 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.33.100, .120, .130 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-22-301, -306, -501 (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.81, .415 (West 2003); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-22-110.

50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308 (1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 259.59(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17; VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1215.

51.

See supra note 49.
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actions, 52 while others waive the requirement that an absent parent
provide consent. 53 Whatever the means, however, a parent who fails
to support or maintain a substantial relationship with his or her child
generally cannot object to an adoption.
In most states, the circumstances under which a biological
parent loses his or her right to prevent an adoption parallel the
circumstances under which the state is authorized to terminate
parental rights. Like state-initiated actions, statutes vary in language
from "abandonment" or "desertion" to general language describing the
specific conduct required. 54 And like state-initiated actions, no matter
what label is used, a parent's failure to support, communicate with, or
visit his or her child for an extended period of time is uniformly
regarded as grounds for denying that parent the right to prevent an
adoption. 55 The period of abandonment required varies from three
months to one year, 5 6 and, like state-initiated actions, the average
required period is six months. 57 Further, as with state-initiated
actions, many adoption statutes allow courts to disregard "incidental"
or "token" efforts made by the absent parent. 58 Thus, if a parent has
failed for an extended period of time to support, visit, or communicate
with his or her child, notwithstanding token efforts, another party can

52. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-204; MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-603; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-16; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2512; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.100.
53. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-202; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604; COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5202; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-10 (1999 & Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-2; IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-19-9-8; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.502; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-312; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-7(2)(b); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-46; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07; OR. REV. STAT. §§

109.314, .324.
54. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.23.050 ("abandonment" and general description of conduct);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-207(7) (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003) ("abandonment"); CAL. FAM. CODE §
8604 (general description of conduct); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-2 (general description of
conduct); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (general description of conduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46
(general description of conduct); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (general description of conduct); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.324 ("desertion"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-301 ("abandonment"); WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 1-22-110 ("abandonment" and "desertion").
55.

See supra note 49.

56. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-207(2) (1 year); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604 (1 year); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-8 (abandon for six months; failure to communicate for 1 year); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.502 (3 months); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-4.2 (West Supp. 2003) (1 year).
57. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9 (Supp. 2002); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050; MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 5-312; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040(7) (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (1998);

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-18 (Michie 1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111;
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-4 (Michie 1999).
58.

See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(d) (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 127.090, 128.105

(Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:6, -C:5 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.324; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-5, -7 (2000).
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adopt the child over the parent's objection, having the effect of
59
permanently terminating his or her parental rights.
3. Termination by Stepparent Adoption
A third way in which parental rights can be involuntarily
As with general
terminated is through stepparent adoptions.
adoptions, every state allows stepparent adoptions to proceed over an
While stepparent adoptions parallel
absent parent's objection. 60
general adoptions in most ways, 6 1 some states have more relaxed
requirements when a natural parent's spouse wishes to adopt his or
her stepchild. 62 For example, a few of the states that ordinarily

59. See supra note 49.
60. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-10A-9, -27 (1992 & Supp. 2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.020(4)(A),
.050; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-102, -103, -106, -531, -533 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-9-202, -204(4)(i), -207; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000, 9003 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-717, -724(a)(2)(D) (West 1993);

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 903, 908, 1103 (1999 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.042(d),
.089 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§19-8-3, -10 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 578-1, -2 (Michie
1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1504, -1509 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/1, 50/2, 50/8 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-9-8, 31-19-15-2, -4; IOWA CODE ANN. §§
600.4(3)(a), .12, .13 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2113, -2136; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
199.470(4)(a), .502; LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. arts. 1243.1, 1245 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 9-204, -301, -302 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5309(a), -312 (1999 & Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §§ 1, 3 (West Supp. 2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.51 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.24, .59(la) (West 2003);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-17-7, -13 (Supp. 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 453.010, .040; MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 42-1-106(1), 42-2-607, -608(h)(B), -610 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-101, -104 (1998);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 127.030, .090, 128.105; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:4, -B:6, -C:5; N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-43, -46; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-11, -15, -18, -32; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 110,
111 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-3-603, 48-4-101, -102 (2001); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-03(4)(a), -06 (1997 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.03(D)(1),
.07, (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7503-1.1, -2.1, 7505-2.1, -4.2 (West 1998 & Supp.
2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.309, .314, .324; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2511, 2903; R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 15-7-4, -5; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1572, -1695(A)(1), -1820 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-6-4, -17; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-102, -113, -115 (2001 & Supp.
2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001(b)(2), .016 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3a-402,
-408, 78-30-1(3)(a)(i), -4.16 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§
63.2-1201, -1203 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.33.100, .120, .140 (West 1997); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-22-301, -306, -501 (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.81, .90(b), .415
(West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-22-104, -110 (Michie 2003).
61. Stepparent adoptions are often included, either explicitly or implicitly, within general
adoption statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.020(4)(A); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-204(4)(i); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.042(d); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-1; IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.4(3)(a); KY. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 199.470(4)(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-1503(4)(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(D)(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001(b)(2); WIS. STAT.

ANN. § 48.90(b). Thus, the same requirements for consent, waiver, time of abandonment, etc.
often apply equally to stepparent adoptions. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West Supp. 2003), 9003 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-5-203(1)(d) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(d) (1994); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. arts.
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require that an objecting parent's rights be terminated before or in
conjunction with adoption proceedings remove this procedural hurdle
when the spouse of a natural parent tries to adopt a stepchild. 63 In
other states, failure to provide a "substantial" amount of child support
for an extended period of time is, in and of itself, sufficient to create a
rebuttable presumption that the absent parent has abandoned the
64
child, thereby eliminating the need for the absent parent's consent.
Louisiana even provides for a rebuttable presumption that a
stepparent adoption is in the child's best interests, 65 and California
requires only the consent of the present parent if that parent has sole
custody. 66 Thus, an absent parent faces the very real possibility of
permanently losing his or her parental rights if any party other than
the natural parent cares for the child or if the other natural parent
eventually gets married.
III. THE VOID AND THE INCONSISTENCY: ABSENT PARENTS' RIGHTS ARE
PROTECTED BY CIRCUMSTANCE, WHILE PRESENT PARENTS' RIGHTS ARE
RESTRICTED BY CUSTODY
A. Present ParentsAre Barredfrom Existing Means of Termination
Currently, no legal means exist by which a natural parent can
acquire full parental rights when there is a living, absent parent. No
state offers an explicit statutory remedy for this circumstance, and
state statutes and case law generally foreclose the availability of
private termination proceedings and natural parent adoptions.

1245 (West Supp. 2003), 1255 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.51(6) (West 2002); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (1989).
63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.102(1) (West 1997); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. arts.
1245 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.51(6) (West 2002); VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,§ 1102(b) (2002).
64.

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(d) (1994);

LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1245 (West Supp. 2003).
65. LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1255(B) (West 1995) ("When a court has granted
custody to either the child's grandparents or his parent married to the stepparent petitioner,
there shall be a rebuttable presumption that this adoption is in the best interests of the child.").
66. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9003(c) (West 1994) ("The consent, when reciting that the person
giving it is entitled to sole custody of the child ...is prima facie evidence of the right of the
person signing the consent to the sole custody of the child and that person's sole right to
consent.").
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1. Termination Foreclosed to the Present Parent
Statutes authorizing termination of parental rights are
generally unavailable to a natural parent seeking to terminate an
absent parent's rights on grounds of abandonment. Termination
statutes apply in only two contexts: state-initiated proceedings and
adoption proceedings. 67 In fact, many state statutes specifically
restrict the filing of termination petitions to authorized state
agencies.6 8
Other statutes restrict the filing of such actions to
situations in which adoption is contemplated. 69 And, while the plain
language of the remaining statutes appears to allow a natural parent
to initiate a termination action, 70 courts generally prevent natural
71
parents from doing so.

67. See, e.g., Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10, at 131, 135-39.
68. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3604 (2002); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/35.2 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4(a)
(Michie 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-809(a) (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, §§ 24 29 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(1) (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43292.02 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-18 (West 2002); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 634 (McKinney
1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.7 (West Supp. 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a) (2000);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.2 (Michie 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Michie 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.132 (West Supp. 2003).
69. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-63 (Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:1
(2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(A) (Michie Supp. 2003); OR. REV. SWAT. § 419B.500 (2001); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2512 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.2. Some states allow a termination action for adoption purposes
by adding prospective adoptive parents or foster parents to the list of persons who may file a
petition. See, e.g., LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1004(G) (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.19b(1) (West 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(5) (West Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15A, § 3-504 (2002).
70. While some statutes explicitly allow a parent to initiate a termination action against
the other parent, other statutes allow, generally, "any person" or "any interested party" to
initiate a termination action. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715 (West Supp. 2003),
IDAHO CODE § 16-2004 (Michie 2001) IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.5 (West 2001), N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7B-1103 (2001), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.42 (West 2003), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-310 (Michie
2003), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West Supp. 2002), CAL. FAM. CODE § 7841 (West
1994), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806 (West 2003), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1581 (2000), and UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-404 (2002).
71. Although such actions have sporadically been allowed in extreme cases, these cases are
generally older, and most have been implicitly or explicitly overruled by more recent opinions.
For example, in Connecticut, a mother was allowed to terminate the parental rights of the father
who had a history of sexual assault, was incarcerated for sexually assaulting the mother, had
never seen his child, and had no intentions to establish a parent-child relationship. In re
Rebecca W., 510 A.2d 1017 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). However, this was quite obviously an extreme
case, and it is the last known case in Connecticut allowing such an action. In Delaware, such an
action was allowed upon the absent parent's consent. In re Monahan, 281 A.2d 620 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1971). However, a later case noted that changes made to Delaware statutes in 1975 preclude
such termination by limiting actions to situations in which adoption is contemplated. In re
D.E.R., No. 99-06-3TK, 2002 WL 31450946, at *1-2 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 11, 2002). In Texas, such
actions have been allowed in extraordinary situations. See Brazier v. Brazier, 597 S.W.2d 442
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Termination statutes that restrict filing to state agencies or
prospective adoptive parents clearly provide no remedy for the
situation at issue. Natural parents have no access to proceedings that
are limited to state agencies, as the state has no need to invest time or
resources where a child is being properly cared for by the remaining
natural parent. 72 Although many statutes allow states to terminate
one parent's rights while leaving the other parent with full rights and
custody of the child, 73 state agencies are only compelled to do so when
the parent subject to termination is currently placing the child in
substantial physical danger. 74 A state agency generally will not
intervene where an absent parent has simply failed to support or visit
a child. 75 Similarly, termination proceedings available to parents
contemplating adoption provide no recourse for a present parent
unless he or she marries and the stepparent is willing to assume the
full and permanent duties of a natural parent. 76 Thus, the majority of
states have statutorily foreclosed the ability of a present parent to
terminate an absent parent's rights.
The remaining states have generally foreclosed this possibility
through case law purporting to effectuate legislative intent and

(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (allowing mother to terminate rights of statutorily presumed father where
he was most likely not the biological father, he had expressed indifference to children, and he
was serving a life sentence in prison); G.W.H. v. D.A.H., 650 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(allowing mother to terminate father's parental rights where father had long history of violence
against women and was serving a 50-year sentence for murdering a woman by strangulation,
over dissent's objection that the court should have required a finding that the father had actually
hurt the children). However, Texas courts have also denied such actions where the initiating
parent fails to show that the other parent has actually physically abused the children. See
Mayfield v. Smith, 608 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (denying termination where,
although father had history of incarceration for violent crimes and children were frightened and
often cried when he visited, mother could not prove that father "ever hit the children or abused
them physically"); see also G.W.H., 650 S.W.2d at 482-84 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
72. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7802; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11103 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.500; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-27.
74. Because termination proceedings require the expenditure of limited state resources,
states are only compelled to bring termination suits when the child is in immediate need of a safe
and stable home; states have no immediate interest in terminating an absent parent's rights
where the child is currently in the safe and suitable care of the present parent. See, e.g., In re
Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to intervene where the
child is not "abused, neglected, or dependent" and the custodial parent "presently provides a
loving and comfortable home for her"); Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10, at 137-39.
75. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (refusing
to intervene where the child is not "abused, neglected, or dependent" and the custodial parent
"presently provides a loving and comfortable home for her"); Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10,
at 137-39.
76. See, e.g., In re K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986); State v. R.L.P., 772
P.2d 1054, 1058 (Wyo. 1989).
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further general public policy. 77 Courts hearing these cases generally
hold contrary to the plain language of statutes, which would otherwise
allow a natural parent to bring a termination action, based primarily
on the courts' refusals to relieve the absent parents of their child
support obligations. 78 Despite extended histories of abandonment,
threats of disruption to the children's lives, the increased burdens
placed on the present parents, the detrimental characters of the
absent parents, and in many cases, even the consent of both parents to
the termination, 79 courts have held that depriving a child of one
parent's financial support is not in the child's best interests. 8 0 Thus,
the common law has generally foreclosed the present parent's access
to the remaining termination statutes.
2. Adoption Foreclosed to the Present Parent
Like termination statutes, adoption statutes provide no
recourse for a natural parent seeking to terminate an absent parent's
rights.
Similar to termination statutes, some adoption statutes
77. See, e.g., K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d at 371-72 (reversing termination to avoid relieving father
of child support obligation, despite consent of both parents, ongoing conflict between parents,
and absence of relationship between father and child); C.J.H. v. A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COAR3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660, at *1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002) (denying termination to avoid
relieving father of child support obligation, despite consent of both parties, mother's
acknowledgment of impact of decision, mother's financial stability and strong family support,
and fact that father had never even seen his child); R.L.P., 772 P.2d at 1057-58 (voiding order of
termination as "a sham" where mother had no plans to marry, adoption was never contemplated,
and there was no guardian ad litem representing the interests of the child).
78. The Iowa code includes "[a] parent" as one of the individuals who may petition for
termination of a parent's rights, IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (WEST 2001), yet the Court of Appeals
of Iowa held, " 'We cannot be persuaded that the legislature intended section 600A.8 to alter so
radically the parental support obligation.' " K.J.K, 396 N.W.2d at 371 (quoting In re D.W.K.,
365 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Iowa 1985)). The Tennessee code allows "any person ... who has knowledge
of the facts alleged or is informed and believes that they are true" to petition for the termination
of a parent's rights, TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-119 (2001), yet the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
held, "'[L]egislative and judicial efforts to hold parents to their financial responsibility to support
their children would be eviscerated if we were to allow an unfettered legal avenue through which
a parent ... could avoid all responsibility for future support."' C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at *7
(quoting In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d 107, 117 (Conn. 1985)).
79. See, e.g., K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d at 370-71 (finding both parents consented, child was
conceived while father was married to another woman, father had not seen child or spoken to
mother since learning of her pregnancy, mother was worried about strain of future interference,
and mother intends to remarry and have husband adopt); C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at *1
(finding father has never seen child nor does he have any interest in or intention to see child,
mother is financially secure and has strong family support, and both parties consent); Mayfield
v. Smith, 608 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (acknowledging that the absent parent has
history of incarceration for violent crimes and the children become frightened and upset when he
visits); R.L.P., 772 P.2d at 1054-56 (both parties consent and father does not support or visit
child).
80. See, e.g., K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d at 371-72; C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at *8.
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specifically preclude a natural parent with an existing legal parentchild relationship from adopting his or her own child.8 ' However, the
vast majority of adoption statutes, by their plain language, allow a
natural parent to adopt his or her own child, thereby allowing a
present parent to acquire full parental rights.8 2 As with termination,
however, courts have often stepped in to foreclose this option to
8
natural parents.

3

In states that specifically preclude a natural parent who has an
existing legal relationship with a child from adopting that child, a
natural parent cannot acquire full parental rights through adoption
unless the parent's rights have previously been terminated.8 4 Thus, a
parent who has consistently remained a fit and responsible parent is
denied the right to adopt, while a parent who has given the state

81. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 903 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-1 (Michie
1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1201 (Michie 2002).
82. Most state adoptions statutes allow, generally, for "anyone" or "any adult" to petition for
adoption of a child. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5 (Supp. 2002); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.020
(Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-103 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-202(1) (2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3 (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/2 (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. §

600.4 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2113 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470(1) (Michie
1998); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1221 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-301
(West Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 1
(West Supp. 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22(1) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(1)
(Supp. 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.010 (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-102 (Supp. 2002); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-43 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-11 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
48-1-103 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.309 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (West 2001);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-4 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1670 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-2 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-115(a) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 162.001 (Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(a)(ii) (2002); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.33.140(2) (West 1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-201 (Michie 2001). Further,
some explicitly authorize the "natural" or "birth" parent of a child to petition to adopt that child.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-204(3) (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 1997); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-03(3) (Supp. 2003).
83. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925); L.J.R. v. T.T., 739 So. 2d 1283
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Green
v. Sollenberger, 656 A.2d 773 (Md. 1995); In re Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); In
re Graham, 63 Ohio Misc. 22 (Ct. C.P. 1980); Gilbertson v. Gilbertson, 498 P.2d 1381 (Okla.
1972); Campbell v. Kindred, 554 P.2d 599 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); see also D.H.S. v. Sabattus, 683
A.2d 170, 171-72 (Me. 1996) (declining to void adoption because validity had not been presently
challenged, but indicating in dicta that it would likely be declared void if challenged); Bridges v.
Nicely, 497 A.2d 142, 148-49 (Md. 1995) (acknowledging that the plain meaning of the statute
may allow for such action, but expressing concern for contrary legislative policy, and remanding
to the circuit court to determine child's best interests).
84. See, e.g., Marshall, 239 P. at 37-38 ('The natural mother of a child could legally adopt
such child only in a case wherein her parental relationship had theretofore been severed as a
matter of law ....
"); Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 1996) ("Despite the
permanency of a termination order, a parent whose parental rights have been terminated is not
precluded from establishing new rights to his or her child through independent adoption
proceedings.").
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reason to terminate his or her parental rights retains the option of
later seeking to adopt the child, thereby acquiring full parental rights.
In the majority of states, where the plain language of adoption
statutes allows a natural parent to adopt his or her child,8 5 the
common law has again stepped in to close this avenue to the present
natural parent.8 6 The underlying basis for such rulings is the notion
that the primary purpose of adoption is to create a legal relationship
that does not already exist.8 7 Like the courts in termination cases,
courts denying present parent adoption petitions rely upon legislative
intent rather than the plain statutory language.8 8 Indeed, in several
of these cases, the adoption had been granted pursuant to the plain
meaning of the statute, and the adoption was later found void

85. See supra note 82.
86. See supra note 83. For an analysis of the inconsistency in Maryland case law, see
Jennifer R. Terrasa, Note, Limitations on Who May Adopt: A Natural Mother May Not Adopt Her
Own Natural Children Notwithstanding the Consent of the Natural Father and the Children
Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118, 656 A.2d 773 (1995), 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 201, 215-24 (1996).
87. See, e.g., Marshall, 239 P. at 37-38; L.J.R., 739 So. 2d at 1284; Green, 656 A.2d at 77778; Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d at 846-47; Graham, 63 Ohio Misc. at 23; Gilbertson, 498 P.2d at 1384.
88. Each of the applicable state adoption statutes, on its face, allows such adoptions. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601(a) (West 1994) (requiring only that adoptive parent be at least ten years
older than the child); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 1997) (explicitly including birth parent as
individual who may petition to adopt child); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-309(a) (1999) ("Any
adult may petition a court to decree an adoption."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(B)-(C) (West
2000) (listing "[a]n unmarried adult" and "[t]he unmarried minor parent of the person to be
adopted" as individuals who may adopt); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7503-1.1(3) (West Supp.
2003) (listing "[a]n unmarried person who is at least twenty-on (21) years of age" as an
individual who may adopt); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.309(1) (2001) ("Any person may petition the
circuit court for leave to adopt another person ....").Nonetheless, the courts opined that such a
result could not have been the legislatures' intent. See Marshall, 239 P. at 38 ("We are not
prepared to hold that section 229 of the Civil Code was intended to apply to a situation such as
this, and to effect a result so plainly opposite to that which was intended."); L.J.R., 739 So. 2d at
1284 ("Like the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 'we do not believe ... that the legislature
contemplated the use of adoption proceedings for the sole purpose of terminating parental rights
...." (quoting Gilbertson, 498 P.2d at 1384)); Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665, 669 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("The procedure utilized ...violates the intent and purposes of the Florida
adoption law."); Green, 656 A.2d at 777 ("We hold that despite the broad and seemingly
unqualified language used in these provisions, the General Assembly never intended for natural
parents to be permitted to adopt their own legitimate children."); Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d at 847
("We . . . do not believe that the General Assembly intended for adoption proceedings to be
available for the 'adoption' of one's own natural child, born in wedlock .... ); Graham, 63 Ohio
Misc. at 25 ("Sound public policy dictates that the adoption statutes should not be construed to
allow the natural mother to adopt her own minor children ...");Gilbertson, 498 P.2d at 1384
("[Wge do not believe the Legislature intended to provide a proceeding for a parent to adopt his
natural, legitimate child."); Campbell, 554 P.2d at 600 (agreeing with the legislative intent
reasoning found in Gilbertson, Marshall, and C.J.S., and further finding that the statute of
limitations on challenging adoptions does not apply because "[tihe intention of the legislature in
adopting [the statute of limitations] appears to have been for a different purpose").
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pursuant to the appellate courts' reliance on legislative intent and
public policy.8 9
While courts denying present parent adoption petitions are
adamant that the primary purpose of adoption is to create a new legal
relationship, they presume that the legal relationship formed through
adoption is no different than the legal relationship of custody occupied
by a present parent. 90 Although one court recognized that adoption
might create more inclusive rights than an order establishing
paternity, 91 most courts that have rejected present parent adoptions
have opined that adoption "accords no benefits, rights, obligations, or
duties which did not exist as the result of the natural [parent-child]
relationship. "92
Further, by focusing on the purpose of creating new legal
relationships, courts have generally failed to address the other
purposes that adoption is meant to serve. In addition to creating new
legal relationships, adoption statutes are meant to provide stability in
a child's home, protect the parent-child relationship from future
interference, and generally promote the well-being of the adopted
child. 93 Although, in a couple of the cases, the petitioning parents
argued that adoption does serve other purposes, the courts found such
arguments unpersuasive, again focusing on the children's monetary

89. Marshall, 239 P. at 37-38; L.J.R., 739 So. 2d at 1284; Peregood, 663 So. 2d at 667, 669;
Green, 656 A.2d at 775, 779; Gilbertson, 498 P.2d at 1383-84; Campbell, 554 P.2d at 599-600.
90. See L.J.R., 739 So. 2d at 1284 ("Granting her petition for adoption by birthparent
'confer[red few or] no additional rights, privileges, or benefit upon the childo."' (quoting Graham,
63 Ohio Misc. at 25)); Green, 656 A.2d at 777 ("[N]o new rights or obligations attach as a result of
the adoption. . . . [T]he status of the parties was in no way enhanced, nor was their legal
relationship altered."); Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d at 847 ("[Adoption] accords no benefits, rights,
obligations, or duties which did not exist as the result of the natural relationship."); Graham, 63
Ohio Misc. at 25 ("The granting of this adoption would confer no additional rights, privileges, or
benefit upon the children."); Gilbertson, 498 P.2d at 1384 ("[Ajdoption confers no benefits or
rights nor imposes any obligations or duties not previously existing as a result of the natural
relationship."); Campbell, 554 P.2d at 600 ("The status of the children's home was not changed
nor was there any change in the relationship, legal or otherwise, with respect to the father.").
91. Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d at 847.
92. Id.; see also supra note 90.
93. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(a) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-1501A(2)(a) (Michie
2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2002); In re Carl,
709 N.Y.S.2d 905, 910 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1986) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS], reprinted in JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE
151, 154 (1996) [hereinafter BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD]; Lisa A. Fuller, Note, Interstate
Succession Rights of Adopted Children: Should the Stepparent Exception be Extended?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1188, 1188 (1992).
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interests in support. 94 Consequently, as with termination, adoption
has generally been foreclosed as an available remedy for a natural
parent to acquire full parental rights, leaving the present parent with
no alternative to custody.
B. Custody Is Not Termination
Without adoption or termination of the absent parent's rights,
a present parent's only legal right in his or her child is custody. Be it
legal custody, physical custody, primary custody, sole custody,
parental responsibility, or whatever title a state places upon the right,
it remains limited and constricted by the absent parent's permanent
parental rights. 95 The legal designation of custody is always attached
to a court's ongoing and discretionary authority to modify or impose
restrictions on its terms at any time. 96 The end result is that the
present parent's "right to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of [his or her]

.

.

.

children" 97 is inhibited by state

98
requirements and forever susceptible to a state court's interference.
State interferences are not limited to "compelling state interests" but,
rather, any "change in circumstances" or other factors within the
99
court's discretion.
Even an award of sole custody does not provide complete
freedom from state interference. The custodial parent remains subject
to statutes that require him or her to notify the court and the absent
parent of changes of address, intentions to relocate out of state,
changes in the child's school, and major medical decisions made on
behalf of the child. 10 0 Further, the present parent generally has a

94. See, e.g., Green, 656 A.2d at 776-78; Kohorst, 600 N.E.2d at 847-48; see also Peregood v.
Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665, 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); In re Graham, 63 Ohio Misc. 22, 24 (Ct.
C.P. 1980).
95. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972) (noting that the State's suggestion
that natural father petition for custody "overlooks the fact that legal custody is not parenthood or
adoption ...

and would still ...

leave him seriously prejudiced by reason of his status"); GREIF,

supra note 18, at 160; WHEELER, supra note 18, at 176 ("Custody cases are never closed. The
parent who loses custody at one trial lives to sue another day. The parent who wins, remains
forever on probation.").
96.

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.

§ 19-1-1;

VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 15,

§ 668 (2002);W. VA.CODE ANN.

§ 48-5-703 (Michie 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-204 (Michie 2003).
97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (asserting such rights as undeniably
"fundamental," warranting Fourteenth Amendment protection).
98.

See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973),

reprinted in BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 93, at 3, 23-27 (1996).
99. See supra note 96.
100. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.377 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (Michie
1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-110(3) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-37 (2002); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-9.601(b)(2)-(3); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-202.
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continuing duty to allow the absent parent access to the child's
medical, dental, childcare, counseling, and school records. 10 1 Some
states even allow the absent parent an uninhibited right to
communicate with the child's doctors, counselors, and schools. 10 2
While some states allow certain requirements to be waived for good
cause, as determined by the court, 10 3 many statutes provide that,
unless a noncustodial parent's rights are terminated, the
requirements are absolute. 104
1. Threat of Reestablished Contact
One of the most ominous rights retained by the absent parent
is the right to, after any length of absence, reestablish visitation with
the child. Despite the present parent's judgment, and despite the
emotional damage that such visitation may cause to the child, if an
absent parent's rights have not been legally terminated, he or she
retains the permanent right to reestablish contact and visitation with
the child. 0 5 Further, most states subscribe to a general policy of
allowing and encouraging frequent and regular contact between a

101. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(H) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.13(2)(b)(3) (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-104 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
71, § 34H (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.30 (West 2002); MiSS. CODE ANN. §
93-5-26 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.2 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(H); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-7.3 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-110(4)-(5); VA. CODE ANN. §
20-124.6 (Michie 2000).
102. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-601(a)(2)-(4).
103. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.30; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.2; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-6-110; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.6.
104. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-5-24(8), -26; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(H); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-7.3.
105. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(B); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-124(1.5), 129(1)(b)(I) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-4-1, -2 (Michie 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.27; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05.22(2) (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(4)(a)(2) (West 2001);
GREIF, supra note 18, at 161; WHEELER, supra note 18, at 52. But see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.10.160(2)(a)(i) (West 1997) (allowing for the limitation of visitation in cases of "[w]illful
abandonment that continues for extended period of time or substantial refusal to perform
parenting functions"). For discussion of the negative emotional impact continuous rights to
visitation may have on the child, see, for example, In re Rebecca W., 510 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1986) (quoting and agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that 'there would be no
discernible benefit to the child, but rather a clear detriment, from her introduction for the first
time to her father when she is five or six years old"); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 23;
GREIF, supra note 18, at 27; Charles E. Depner, Child Custody Research at the Crossroads, in
CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 153, 160 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2002); and Sara

S. McLanahan & Marcia J. Carlson, Welfare Reform, Fertility, and FatherInvolvement, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND WELFARE REFORM 147, 153 (2002), available at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2826/-information-show.htm?doc-id=102678.
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child and the noncustodial parent.1 0 6 While such contact can be
restricted or denied, the custodial parent bears the burden of showing
extraordinary circumstances amounting to substantial endangerment
of the child. 10 7 And while some jurisdictions recognize the need for
gradual reestablishment of contact after extended periods of absence,
they still require eventual reestablishment of contact. 0 8 Thus, despite
extended periods of failure to support, visit, or communicate with one's
child, an absent parent will likely be allowed visitation if, at some
point in the future, he or she requests it.
2. Removal and Relocation Restrictions
Most custody orders restrict a custodial parent's ability to move
with the child, especially when the move is to another state. 10 9 While
some jurisdictions merely require the custodial parent to notify the
court and the other parent of the move, 110 others prohibit removal

106. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (West 2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-32(2) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 650 (2002). But see OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.101(1) (2001) (limits policy of "frequent and continuing contact" to "parents who have
shown the ability to act in the best interests of the child").
107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(B); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), 129(1)(b)(1); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-4-1, -2; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27a(3); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-05-22(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (requires past physical or emotional abuse, and
only allows for restriction until abuse ceases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-32(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 650; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(4)(b); WHEELER, supra note 18, at 52. For examples of what
constitutes extraordinary circumstances, see, for example, Welker v. Welker, No. C3-01-2100,
2002 WL 2004594, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2002) (affirming finding of endangerment
warranting denial of visitation where father had sexually abused child, but noting denial was not
permanent and father could always move to modify order at a later date); Ceasar A.R. v. Raquel
D., 578 N.Y.S.2d 831, 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (affirming finding of exceptional circumstances
warranting denial of visitation where father had murdered children's mother and raped their
stepsister and children feared him); In re Waters, No. CA88-09-131, 1989 WL 145972, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1989) (affirming finding of extraordinary circumstances warranting denial of
visitation to father where child was the result of the father raping the child's mother).
108. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-36(2) ("When parent-time has not taken place for an
extended period of time and the child lacks an appropriate bond with the noncustodial parent,
both parents shall consider the possible adverse effects upon the child and gradually reintroduce
an appropriate parent-time plan for the noncustodial parent."); In re C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 482
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (ordering reestablished conduct "even though reconciliation with mother
would be emotionally difficult for the child" by "orchestrating reintroduction to mother in a
gradual manner under the supervision of therapists"); In re Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 620 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1997) (following recommendations of experts that parenting time be "integrated slowly to
prevent long-lasting psychological damage" by ordering supervised visits and by delaying
overnight visits).
109. See, e.g., WHEELER, supra note 18, at 65-66.
110. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129(1)(a)(II); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.5 (Michie
2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.430 (West Supp. 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-202
(Michie 2003).
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without the noncustodial parent's consent or a court order.1 1 1 When
removal is contested, the custodial parent generally has the burden of
proving that the move is in the child's best interests. 112 In the case of
an absent parent, the present parent will likely be able to show that
the move is in the child's best interest; 113 nonetheless, any relocation
114
requires costly and time-consuming litigation.
3. Lack of Authority To Designate Guardian in the Event of Death
As long as the absent parent retains parental rights, the
present parent cannot provide for custody of the child in the event of
the present parent's death. Quite the opposite, in the majority of
states, despite the present parent's wishes or will, custody of the child
automatically reverts to the absent parent.1 15 While a third party,
111. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 30 (West 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
125C.200 (Michie Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 2002).
112. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.377(9) (West 2003); Rice v. Rice, 517 S.E.2d 220, 222
(S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (rebuttable presumption against removal); Goodhand v. Kildoo, 560 S.E.2d
463, 466 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
113. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:23-a(IV)-(V) (Supp. 2002) (placing burden on
objecting parent if custodial parent can show that move is reasonably related to a legitimate
purpose); In re Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996); In re D.M.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Mont.
1998).
114. For general discussion of the time and expense entailed in custody proceedings, see, for
example, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000); WHEELER, supranote 18, at 15, 23.
115. See, e.g., Woodford v. Superior Court of Ariz., 309 P.2d 973, 974 (Ariz. 1957) (noting "the
well-settled proposition that, upon the death of a party who holds legal custody pursuant to a
divorce decree, the right of legal custody automatically inures to the surviving parent"); Brown v.
Brown, 238 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Ark. 1951); In re Guardianship of Donaldson, 223 Cal. Rptr. 707,
711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("Upon the death of the [custodial parent], the [absent parent]
immediately became entitled to sole custody of her children."); Evans v. Santoro, 507 A.2d 1007,
1009-10 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986); In re M.K.S., 726 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("[I]n
the event of the death of one parent, the natural guardianship passes to the surviving parent.");
In re K.R.S., 560 S.E.2d 292, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he father as the surviving parent
automatically became the legal custodian of K.R.S. at the moment of the mother's death since
there had been no prior termination of the father's parental rights."); In re Osborne, 901 P.2d 12,
16 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("Kansas adheres to the majority view that when a divorce decree gives
custody to one parent and that parent dies, the right to custody automatically reverts to the
surviving parent .... ); In re Williams, 447 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (La. Ct. App. 1984); In re Kauch,
264 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Mass. 1970); In re Hohmann, 95 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1959) ("[T]he
majority rule, which is adhered to in this jurisdiction, [is] that upon the death of the parent who
has held custody of a minor child under a divorce decree the right to custody automatically
inures to the surviving natural parent .... "); Stegall v. Stegall, 119 So. 802, 803 (Miss. 1929);
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); In re Estate of K.M., 929
P.2d 870, 872 (Mont. 1996) ("When one parent dies, the surviving parent automatically assumes
the right to custody of the couple's children."); In re Peterson's Guardianship, 229 N.W. 885, 887
(Neb. 1930) ("Upon [the mother's death] the father immediately became entitled to her custody
as a natural right, unaffected by the former decree."); McLaughlin v. Mullin, 651 A.2d 934, 93536 (N.H. 1994); Pollock v. Pollock, 385 N.Y.S.2d 252, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); McDuffie v.
Mitchell, 573 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (N.C. 2002); S.W. v. Duncan, 24 P.3d 846, 851-52 (Okla. 2001);
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such as a godparent or grandparent, can petition the court for custody,
he or she will be facing an uphill battle against the common
presumption that the surviving parent is entitled to custody absent a
showing of unfitness. 116 For the absent parent who continues to have
no interest in raising the child, this may mean that he or she regains
custody only to leave the child with another person of his or her
choice, rather than the choice of the deceased parent. 117
The
unfortunate effect is that, after enduring the loss of his or her primary
parent, the child may be forced to move and live with strangers,
leaving behind the family and friends the child became attached to
while growing up with the present parent. 118
4.

Ongoing Threat of Penalties for Violations

Finally, each of the requirements and restrictions that
accompany a custody order is attached to statutorily prescribed
penalties that can be imposed upon the present parent in the event of
a violation. A violating parent risks being held in contempt of court,
which may result in fines, an award of attorney's fees, jail time, or
In re Adoption of Abelsen, 225 P.2d 768, 770 (Or. 1950); Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I.
1999); Dodge v. Dodge, 505 S.E.2d 344, 348 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); Peacock v. Bradshaw, 194
S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1946); Nielson v. Nielson, 826 P.2d 1065, 1066-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Judd v. Van Horn, 81 S.E.2d 432, 435 (Va. 1954); In re Welfare of Frank, 248 P.2d 553, 554
(Wash. 1952) ("Upon the death of the mother the father's right of custody as a natural parent
revived automatically without any court action."); Sass v. Sass, 16 N.W.2d 829, 830-31 (Wis.
1944). But see IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-3-6(a)-(b) (Michie 1997) ("[S]urviving parent of a minor
does not have the right to custody of the minor without a proceeding authorized by law" if the
surviving parent's visitation was previously supervised or suspended.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-5
(Custody "shall not revert to the surviving parent without an order or judgment... to that
effect.").
116. See, e.g., Abrams v. Connolly, 781 P.2d 651, 657 (Colo. 1989); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d
99, 108 (Ga. 2001) ("[A] third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child
will suffer physical or emotional harm if custody were awarded to the biological parent.");
Chambers v. Lee, 112 S.E.2d 614, 615 (Ga. 1960); In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 175
(Minn. 2002) ("[T]he presumption favoring the surviving parent can be overcome only by
evidence evincing the existence of extraordinary circumstances of a grave and weighty nature
.... "); McDuffie v. Mitchell, 573 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Dodge, 505 S.E.2d at
349 ('Once the natural parent is deemed fit, the issue of custody is decided."' (quoting Moore v.
Moore, 386 S.E.2d 456, 458 (S.C. 1989))). But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1(B) (West Supp.
2003) (custody can be denied to remaining natural parent in case of twelve months of failure to
support or abandonment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (Michie 1999) ("[P]arent's presumptive
right to custody ... may be rebutted by proof . . . [t]hat the parent has abandoned ...the
child ... [or] has abdicated his or her parental rights and responsibilities .... ").
117. See, e.g., Donaldson, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (holding that, upon father's death, custody
automatically reverted to surviving mother, despite her prolonged absence, and it was within her
authority to take children from paternal aunt and give them to her parents in another state).
118. See, e.g., id.; Dodge, 505 S.E.2d at 352 (holding that once custody reverts to surviving
father, court has no authority to order ongoing contact or visitation with children's stepfather
and half-brother, with whom they have lived the majority of their lives).
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additional restrictions added to the custody order. 119 A court may
even consider such a violation grounds for modification of the
custodial arrangement. 120 Whether the restriction amounts to a mere
time-consuming and costly inconvenience, an invasion of familial
privacy, or a potential disruption to the existing family unit, it is a
legal requirement that must be followed. Even if the absent parent
chooses not to enforce the requirements, the present parent remains
technically and indefinitely constrained. 12 ' While the absent parent
has no legal obligation to visit his or her child or to keep the present
parent informed of his or her whereabouts,' 22 the present parent must
learn to live around the rights forever reserved for the absent parent.
C. Inconsistent and Illogical Outcomes
Where a biological parent has abandoned his or her child,
failing to visit, communicate with, or support the child for extended
periods of time, the parent will most likely lose his or her rights if the
child is cared for by the state, a stranger, or a relative. 123 However, if
the other parent is present, responsible, and caring, the absent
parent's parental rights will be forever preserved by state law. 124 The
absent parent's rights currently depend upon the actions and efforts of
the other biological parent. If the other parent does nothing, the
absent parent retains nothing. 125 If the other parent assumes not only
his or her parental responsibilities but the absent parent's as well, the
absent parent retains everything.' 26 The absent parent acts no
differently; it is the efforts of others that either permanently
terminate or permanently preserve the absent parent's rights.
Where a person assumes complete responsibility for a child,
providing full financial and emotional support, all of the child's daily
contact, nurture, and encouragement, and establishing the only
119. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-701(g) (Supp. 2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.400(6)-(7)
(West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364.15 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2705.031(B)(2), (E),
.05(A) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 111.3(D) (West 2001).

120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(4)(c)(5) (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 9-105(2) (1999);

NEB. REV. STAT. § 125C.200 (Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §

111.3(D)(7).
121. See supra notes 96, 104 and accompanying text; see also WHEELER, supra note 18, at
176 ("Custody cases are never closed. The parent who loses custody at one trial lives to sue
another day. The parent who wins, remains forever on probation.").
122. See, e.g., DOWD, supra note 18, at 67-69; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 26; GREIF,

supra note 18, at 166.
123. See supra Parts II.B.1. & 2.
124. See supra Parts ILI.A & B.
125. See supra Part I.B.
126. See supra Parts III.A. & B.
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parental relationship that the child has, he or she will be entitled to
the exclusive right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children"'127 if he or she is an adoptive parent. 128
However, a natural parent, under the same circumstances, is not
entitled to the exclusive right "to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children."' 129 For as long as the absent
parent is alive, unless the present parent remarries and completes a
stepparent adoption, the present parent's rights remain subject to
interference by the state and the whims of the absent parent.130

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR FILLING THE VOID
The law needs to provide a means for present parents to realize
the full parental rights guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The present confinement to custody is simply not suited
for the situation in which the noncustodial parent becomes completely
absent from the child's life.' 3 1 When a parent abandons his or her
child, the protection of that parent's rights should no longer depend
upon the identity of the child's caretaker, specifically not in the all or
nothing fashion presently afforded. 32 Nor should a responsible
parent's rights be constrained simply because he or she is the natural
parent rather than an adoptive parent.1 33 The law needs to provide
present parents with the same legal recourse presently available to
the state and adoptive parents.

127. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
128. See supra Part II.B.
129. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
130. Id. at 67-68; see also supra Part II.B.3.
131. See supra Part III.B for discussion of the restrictions and limitations on custody. For
discussion of the problems this designation creates, see, for example, GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 98, at 46-49 ("[T]he law will not act in the child's interests if it tries to do the impossible-to
guess the future and to impose on the caregiver special conditions for the child's day-to-day or
weekend-to-weekend care. This leads to harmful and threatening discontinuity .... ); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979), reprinted in

BEST

INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 93, at 85, 90-91; Buss, supra note 1, at 649-54 ("[C]hildrearing authority.., belongs with whomever has undertaken parental responsibilities and
thereby established her expertise.").
132. See supra Parts II.B & III.B.
133. Both law and society favor natural parents over all other child caretakers. See, e.g.,
Johnson, supra note 16, at 400; Kristin J. Brandon, Comment, The Liberty Interests of Foster
Parents and the Future of Foster Care, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 403, 415 (1994) (recognizing the
distinction between the rights of caretakers, which are state-created, and the rights of biological
parents, which are "intrinsic human rights").

1934

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1907

A. Policy Arguments Against Termination
Providing a natural parent legal means to terminate an absent
parent's rights faces many of the same arguments as any action
resulting in the termination of parental rights.
The threshold
argument is that, as a constitutionally protected liberty, parental
rights should be preserved whenever possible and termination should
be allowed only in the most extreme circumstances. 13 4 This argument
assumes, however, that the parent subject to termination is entitled to
constitutional protection. Both the assumption and the argument fail
in the case of an absent parent because, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection."1 35 By failing to assume parental
responsibilities and failing to fulfill a parental role, the absent parent
loses constitutional protection of his or her parental rights. 13 6 This
result is grounded in Supreme Court precedent and is apparent in
state laws that allow for termination upon abandonment. 137 While the
absent parent remains entitled to procedural due process protection to
assure that he or she has, in fact, forsaken his or her parental
responsibilities, once abandonment is established, the parent has no
further rights to preserve. 138 At the very least, any rights that the
absent parent may have should be outweighed by the present parent's
139
constitutional rights.
The argument can also be made that reducing the child to a
single parent is contrary to the child's interests in having the benefit
of two parents. 140 However, the absent parent has already deprived

134. See, e.g., HARDIN & LANCOUR, supra note 16, at 4; Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10, at
135; Johnson, supra note 16, at 400; Verna Lilburn, Note, Abandonment as Grounds for the
Termination of ParentalRights, 5 CONN. PROB. L.J. 263, 263, 287-88 (1991).
135. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
136. See supra Part II.A.2.
137. See id.; supra Part II.B.
138. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982);
Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972).
139. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 ("[Tlhe mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection."); id. at 266-67 ("[T]he existence or nonexistence of a
substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the
rights of the parent and the best interests of the child."); id. at 267-68 ("If one parent has an
established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or
never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from
according the two parents different legal rights.").
140. See, e.g., DOWD, supra note 18, at 3-4, 13, 15, 27-28; McLanahan & Carlson, supra note
105, at 150-53; Linda Whobrey Rohman et al., The Best Interests of the Child in Custody
Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 60, 74 (Lois A. Weithorn ed.,
1987); Iris Marion Young, Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family

2003]

WHEN ONE PARENT GOES

1935

the child of such benefit. 14 1 Furthermore, while early research
indicated that children fare better emotionally in two-parent homes,
recent research reveals that any differences are attributable to factors
other than the number of parents a child has, and in fact, that many
children may actually benefit emotionally from living in strong singleparent homes. 142 Modern state adoption laws uniformly recognize that
a single parent is as capable of successfully raising a child as are twoparent households. 143 Further, termination does not eliminate the
Values, in HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 15, 20 (Uma Narayan & Julia J. Bartkowiak eds.,
1999).
141. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
142. For general discussion of the early research that assumed two-parent homes were better
than single-parent homes, see authorities cited supra note 140. For more modern assessments,
challenging the old conclusions, and asserting that the number of parents in a home does not
dictate a child's well-being, see, for example, STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE 222
(1992); DOWD, supra note 18, at xv, xix, 36, 39, 109; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 13; and
Depner, supra note 105, at 162. In fact, modern research has revealed that most of the negative
differences between children of two-parent households and children of single-parent households
can be attributed to the common economic disparities between the two types of households,
rather than the number of parents therein. See, e.g., DOWD, supra note 18, at 26, 39, 109;
MARIANNE

E.

PAGE & ANN HUFF STEVENS,

WILL YOU MISS ME WHEN

I

AM GONE?:

THE

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ABSENT PARENTS 4-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8786, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8786.
Modern research has further
revealed that children may actually fare better in strong single-parent homes. See, e.g., DOWD,
supranote 18, at xviii, 33, 36, 103, 109-10, 113; Young, supra note 140, at 20-21.
143. All states now allow single-parent adoptions. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-5(2) (1992);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.020(a)(2) (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-103 (West 1999); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-204(2) (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601(b) (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-5-202(1) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3) (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 915(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2) (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3 (1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-1 (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Michie 2001); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 50/2 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-11-1 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §
600.4 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2113 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470(1) (Michie
1998); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1221 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-301
(West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-309(a)-(b) (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §
1 (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.24(1) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.22(1) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(1) (Supp. 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.010
(West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-1-106(2) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-102 (1998); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 127.030 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:343(a) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-36 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 110 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-103 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1415-03(2) (Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(B) (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7503-1.1(3) (West Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.309(1) (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2312 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-4(a) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1670 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-2 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-115 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-301(3)(a)(ii) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1201 (Michie
2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.140(2) (West 1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-201 (Michie
2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.82(1)(b) (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-103 (Michie 2003).

Some states explicitly preclude discrimination against an adoptive parent solely because he or
she is single. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5(2) ("No rule or regulation of the Department of
Human Resources or any agency shall prevent an adoption by a single person solely because
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child's ability to develop a relationship with the absent parent. 144
Essentially, the only right that is lost is the absent parent's right to
force such communication or contact upon the present parent and

child. 145
Finally, a recurring theme in the judicial decisions foreclosing a
present parent's ability to terminate an absent parent's rights is the
child's interest in the monetary obligations of the absent parent,
including child support and inheritance.1 46 Notwithstanding the fact
that this argument is purely monetarily based, its weakness lies in the
questionable value of the benefit that would be lost and the general
insignificance placed on such rights in other contexts of termination.
As an initial matter, one has to seriously question the value, if any, of
retaining a support obligation and right of inheritance from a person
who has failed to pay child support for extended periods of time.1 47 In
the modern world of child support collection, in which most debtors
are plagued with negative credit reports, wage assignments, driver's
license suspensions, tax refund intercepts, and potential jail time, a
parent who still fails to pay child support likely has no significant
monetary value from which the child could benefit. 148 Further, by
allowing single parent adoptions and by placing little emphasis on an
adoptive family's financial situation, the law has properly recognized
such person is single ... ");CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3) ("The Court of Probate shall
not disapprove any adoption under this section solely because of an adopting parent's marital
status ....
");MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-309(a)-(b) ("A court may not deny a petition for
adoption solely because the petitioner is single or does not have a spouse.").
144. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(a)-(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 6C(a); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35; OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305(2); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-121(0; Jennifer Wriggins, Parental Rights Termination Jurisprudence:
Questioning the Framework, 52 S.C. L. REV. 241, 263 (2000) (advocating a more flexible and open
adoption process); Fuller, supra note 93, at 1198-99 (explaining the open adoption process).
145. While adoptive parents remain free to allow contact between the children and the
biological parents or relatives, they are generally not compelled to do so by law. See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 8714.7; IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 6C; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 453.080(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-6-17; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-121(f); Calderon v. Torres, 445 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Sowers v. Tsamolias, 929 P.2d 188, 191-92 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); State v.
S.H., 45 P.3d 527, 532 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); In re B.S.Z-S., 875 P.2d 693, 695 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994).
146. See Khristine Ann Heisinger, Note, Child Support Properly a Factor in Determining
Best Interests of Child in Voluntary Termination of ParentalRights, 58 MO. L. REV. 969, 987-88
(1993); supra notes 80, 94 and accompanying text.
147. Research shows that the "strongest predictor" of whether a parent will pay future child
support is whether he or she has paid child support in the past. Nord & Zill, supra note 18.
Many parents who fail to pay support are poor, often unemployed or underemployed.
McLanahan & Carlson, supra note 105, at 147, 156-57.
148. See supra note 147. For general descriptions of modern child support collection, see, for
example, GREIF, supra note 18, at 162-64; McLanahan & Carlson, supra note 105, at 156-58;
Heisinger, supra note 146, at 976-79.
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that monetary considerations should not be a central factor in
determining the best interests of a child. 149 Generally, society and the
state are only concerned that a child is provided with the necessities of
life within a safe and loving home. 150 Clearly, the state has an
interest in preserving both parents' financial obligations where it
appears likely that the child may require state economic assistance at
some time in the future. 151 This interest is taken into account in the
suitability requirement for an adoptive parent 52 and could likewise be
incorporated into a suitability requirement for a natural parent.
B. The Compelling Need for Termination
Present parents should have the exclusive right "to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children."' 153 Where two parents share this right in one child,
admittedly, compromises and state intervention will often become
necessary.154
However, where a present parent
retains
constitutionally protected parental rights, and the other parent has
lost such rights by failing to assume parental responsibilities and
149. Most state statutes require merely that the adoptive parent be "suitable" or "fit" to care
for the child. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 915 (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/2
(West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 9-308 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-5-36(F)(7) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1760(B)(5) (Law. Co-op.
1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-703 (2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-701(a)(3) (Michie 2001).
The few states that refer specifically to the parent's financial status require only that the parent
be of adequate financial means to properly support and educate the child. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-8-3(a) (1999) (allowing adoption by "[a]ny adult person... [who is financially,
physically, and mentally able to have permanent custody of the child"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
199.520(1) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2002) (requiring that "the petitioners are of good moral
character, of reputable standing in the community and of ability to properly maintain and
educate the child ' (emphasis added)); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.350 (requiring that "the petitioner is
of sufficient ability to bring up the child and furnish suitable nurture and education"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-7-14 (using language similar to the Oregon statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1120(a)(10)-(11) (requiring "[t]hat the petitioners are fit persons to have the care and custody of
the child ... [and] are financially able to provide for the child"); see also Rohman, supra note 140,
at 64-65 ("In a custody trial, evidence of economic and financial resources beyond what is needed
to sustain life should be of less import unless tied to the special needs of the child involved.");
Eric V. Meeker, Termination of Parental Rights: Constitutional Rights, State Interests and the
Best Interests of the Child, 17 J. Juv. L. 82, 89 (1996) (arguing that children shouldn't be removed
from their biological parents "for the sole purpose of being placed with families with better
financial portfolios").
150. See supra note 149.
151. See, e.g., In re K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986); Brooks v. Fair, 532
N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); DOWD, supra note 18, at 15, 18; GREIF, supra note 18,
at 163.
152. See supra note 149.
153. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
154. See, e.g., WHEELER, supra note 18, at 49-51.
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failing to fulfill any substantial parental role, there should be no
compromise or state interference. 155 Not only is it unnecessary, but it
is also contrary to constitutional precedent: "so long as a parent
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally
be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
156
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children."
All fit parents have a fundamental right to be free from the
threat of future interference or harassment in matters concerning the
raising of their children. This is one of the underlying premises of
terminating all previous relationships upon any adoption. 157 States
recognize that an adoptive parent has the exclusive right to decide,
without court interference, whether and under what circumstances
any individual can have contact with the adopted child or participate
in the child's life. 158 While many adoptive parents allow such contact
or participation, they are never forced to do so. 159 It would seem to
follow that a natural present parent should be as entitled to such
exclusive rights, if not even more so. 160 A natural present parent
should be fully entitled to the "presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children"1 61 and should not be subject to a
court's continuing jurisdiction to interfere upon any given "change of
162
circumstances" or merely upon the request of the absent parent.
When one parent has abandoned the child, leaving the present parent

155. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("[F]reedom of personal choice in
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."); DOWD, supra note 18, at 103, 168-69; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 7 ("To
safeguard the right of parents to raise their children as they see fit-free of government
intrusion except in cases of abandonment, neglect, or abuse-is to safeguard each child's need for
continuity."); id. at 23, 25, 32; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 90, 92; GOLDSTEIN, IN THE
BEST INTERESTS, supra note 93, at 217, 227.
156. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)).
157. See Fuller, supra note 93, at 1193-94.
158. See supra note 145.
159. See supra notes 144, 145.
160. See supra note 133. An adoption has the effect of severing the child's ties to all
biological relatives, whereas, in the case of a natural present parent terminating an absent
parent's rights, the child retains ties to one of his or her natural parents as well as that parent's
relatives. Thus, if the state can justify allowing an adoptive parent to control the contacts and
relationships a child has, including the right to exclude all of the child's biological relatives from
the child's life, it would seem even more justifiable to allow a natural parent to have such
control, given that the child still has contact with at least one biological relative-the present
parent-and likely many others-the present parent's relatives.
161. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
162. See supra Part II.B; see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 81 ("To say that a
child's relationship with her psychological parents ... must not be interrupted is also to say that
the rights and needs of those adults as parents are to be protected.").
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to pick up the pieces and fulfill both parents' responsibilities, the
absent parent should not retain the right to interfere with or harass
the home that the present parent rebuilds.
A present parent should not be under any obligation to notify
the court and the absent parent of changes in the child's school,
address, or medical history, nor should the present parent be under
any obligation to allow the absent parent access to the child's personal
files. 163
Constitutional protection of parental rights and the
fundamental zone of privacy surrounding the home both support this
proposition.164 Again, when the duties of raising a child are shared
between two separated parents, court interference and requirements
are often necessary. 65 However, when one parent assumes complete
responsibility for raising a child, and the remaining parent is
completely absent from the child's life, state-imposed requirements on
the present parent are, again, unnecessary and completely contrary to
the parent's constitutional rights.1 66 Certainly no court would impose
requirements upon an adoptive parent to allow the biological parents
access to the child's medical and school records, nor would a court
require an adoptive parent to notify the biological parents of changes
of address. 167 Absent a compelling state interest, such as when two
parents retain rights, such restrictions amount to undue state
interference.
A present parent should have the legal right to designate a
guardian for his or her child in the event of his or her death.
Following the "presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of
their children," 168 it seems logical that the present parent is in the
best position to determine who would best raise the child in his or her
absence. 169 It seems equally illogical for states to presume that the
absent parent, who is often a complete stranger to the child, is the
best person to raise the child or designate a guardian.1 70 Particularly
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("[F]reedom of personal choice in
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 32 ("The new family deserves ... to be as
free of state intervention as any other 'intact' family."); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 90;
Buss, supra note 1, at 650, 656.
165. See supra note 154.
166. See supra note 164.
167. See Fuller, supra note 93, at 1188, 1193-94.
168. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
169. See, e.g., id. ("[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children."); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 111 ("The presumption is that parents know
best who should care for their child.").
170. See, e.g., In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 258 (Colo. 1995) (criticizing other
states' presumptions that custody should automatically revert to the surviving parent, and
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in this context, where a child has endured the traumatic loss of his or
her only present parent, the absent parent's retention of legal rights
poses a substantial threat to the child's emotional well-being.171
In addition to the restrictions that naturally accompany
custody orders, there are a multitude of day-to-day obstacles that the
present parent and the child face when the absent parent retains
parental rights. For example, private entities often require both legal
parents' signatures for major decisions such as allowing a child to skip
a grade or undergo elective surgery. 172 State statutes often require
the consent of both legal parents for actions such as name changes,
permit applications, and entry of contracts. 173 Many states require
both parents to consent if a minor child wishes to get married, have an
abortion, or join the armed forces.' 74 While many of these situations
appear rare and their impact insignificant, after years of getting
around the "other parent" section on daily forms, the impact is far
from insignificant to the present parent and the child.
While this list is not intended to be exhaustive, the primary
point should be clear: when an absent parent retains legal rights, the
present parent, the child, and their newly established home life
remain subject to and inhibited by those rights. The natural parent
and the child have already been disadvantaged by the absent parent's
conduct. It is illogical and inequitable to further inhibit their lives in
the name of protecting the absent parent's rights.
C. Filling the Void
1. Method
States should allow present parents to terminate absent
parents' rights in appropriate cases either by incorporating the right
into existing termination or adoption statutes or by creating a
acknowledging that "giving custody to [the absent parent], who is virtually a stranger to [the
child], ignores the welfare of the child and is likely to have a detrimental effect on his emotional
and psychological well-being'); Meeker, supra note 149, at 91 ("It is difficult to conceive, for
example, that a child has an interest in being returned to the custody of the parent who
abandoned or abused her.").
171. See supra note 169.
172. See, e.g., GREIF, supra note 18, at 159.
173. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 2502 (1997) (contract); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5745(b)(2) (Michie 1999) (name change); IOWA CODE ANN. § 674.6 (West 1998) (name change); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.020 (Michie 1999) (name change); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 711.1(5)

(West 2002)(name change); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 99-f (McKinney 2000) (permit
application); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 786.36(1) (West 1997) (name change).
174. See, e.g., GREIF, supra note 18, at 159.
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separate statutory scheme. Because termination of parental rights
actions are already heavily regulated by state law, the simple
approach would be to make these proceedings available to present
parents. 175 State statutes could be amended by either including
natural parents as parties who may petition for termination of the
other parent's parental rights or by allowing natural custodial parents
to adopt their own children. 176 This would certainly be the most
convenient and efficient manner of reform, as the grounds, burdens of
proof, time requirements, and procedures are already provided for.
However, because the situation contemplated has unique aspects and
concerns not present in other contexts, the ideal approach would be for
states to create a separate legal remedy tailored specifically to this
situation.177 A separate statutory scheme allowing a present parent to
terminate the rights of an absent parent could incorporate much of the
substance of existing termination and adoption statutes, while
ensuring availability only in the true absent parent scenario described
78
in this Note.
2. Grounds
Like other actions involving termination of parental rights, the
proposed action would involve a two-prong test. 79 First, the present
parent would have to show that the absent parent has abandoned the
child.
Second, the present parent would have to show that
termination of the absent parent's rights is in the child's best
interests. To satisfy the first prong, the present parent would be
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the absent
parent has abandoned the child. 8 0 Abandonment would consist of a
parent's failure to visit, failure to communicate with, and failure to
support his or her child for a specified period of time without just

175. See supra Part II.B.
176. For discussion of the current availability of these actions to present parents, see supra
Part III.A.
177. Unlike most adoption and termination cases, the child is not in danger and has no need
for immediate placement. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The constitutional rights
at issue, however, include the present parent's rights as well as the absent parent's rights. See
supra Part II.A. Thus, the law's preference for natural parents and presumptions in favor of
parental autonomy will influence various phases of the proceeding differently than in cases
brought by the state or a nonparent. See supra note 133.
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. HARDIN & LANCOUR, supra note 16, at 9-10.

180. In any termination of parental rights action, allegations against the parent subject to
termination must be proven by "clear and convincing" evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 747-48 (1982).
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cause.18 1 As a cautionary measure, states could require the present
parent to show that the absent parent has failed all three of the
18 2
common parental duties: visitation, communication, and support.
Such a requirement would preclude termination in situations where a
child is still receiving some benefit from the absent parent. 8 3 As with
existing statutes, however, courts should be allowed to disregard
incidental or token efforts at communication or support. 184
The absent parent would, of course, have the opportunity to
show just cause for failing to fulfill his or her parental duties.'8 5 Any
181. This language combines the common elements found in state definitions of
abandonment. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a.717(g)(2)(A) (West 1993) ("[T]he child has
been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child"); IDAHO CODE § 162005(a) (Michie 2001) ("The parent has abandoned the child by having willfully failed to
maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or
regular personal contact"); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(b) (West Supp. 2003) ('The parent
has, without good cause, left the child without any provision for parental support and without
making arrangements to visit or communicate with the child, although able to do so").
182. For state statues allowing a finding of abandonment upon a failure of support or
visitation or communication, rather than requiring failure of all three, see, for example, ALASKA
STAT. § 25.23,050(a)(2) (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105(3.1) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. §

19-8-10(b) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-61(b)(1)(C)-(D) (Michie 1999); and LA. CHILDREN'S
CODE ANN. art. 1015(4) (West 1995). See also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
183. If the child is receiving any benefit from the continued relationship, policy arguments
urge that the child's right to such benefit be preserved. See supra notes 140, 146 and
accompanying text. The true absent parent situation contemplated, however, is one in which the
child is receiving no benefits from the relationship. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
184. For examples of state statutes that allow courts to disregard "incidental" or "token"
efforts when determining abandonment, see supra notes 48, and 58. For examples of what
actions constitute "incidental" or "token" efforts, see, for example, Greeson v. Barnes, 900 P.2d
943, 945-46 (Nev. 1995) (finding abandonment proven where, during previous four years, father
visited child once and paid only $60 in child support, which was paid after initiation of
termination suit); In re Brittany L., 737 A.2d 670, 673-74 (N.H. 1999) (holding that efforts
showed "a mere flicker of interest" insufficient to overcome finding of abandonment where
father's only contact with child was through occasional cards on birthdays and major holidays);
and In re Termination of Parental Rights to I.H., 33 P.3d 172, 180 (Wyo. 2001) (holding that
termination of parental rights was warranted where father's only child support payment over
two year period was through an involuntary tax refund intercept).
185. For cases examining what constitutes "just cause," see, for example, In re Adoption of
F.A.R., 747 P.2d 145, 150 (Kan. 1987) ("When a nonconsenting parent is incarcerated and unable
to fulfill the customary parental duties required of an unrestrained parent, the court must
determine whether such parent has pursued the opportunities and options which may be
available to carry out such duties to the best of his or her ability."); In re K.D.O., 889 P.2d 1158,
1159-60 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (holding father has "reasonable cause" for his failure to support
child's mother during her pregnancy where she refused his offers to provide financial support
and transportation); In re K.L.H., 771 So. 2d 706, 709 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (trial court erred by
failing to consider the domestic abuse endured by noncustodial mother and the instability in her
living arrangements in determining whether she had "just cause" for failing to pay child support
during one year period); Chastain v. Timmons, 558 So. 2d 344, 346-47 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding "just cause" where custodial mother returned toys and clothes sent by noncustodial
father, moved frequently, preventing child support payments from reaching her, and refused to
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interference by the present parent or any other circumstances beyond
the absent parent's control would be taken into account when
determining just cause. Further, because the child is not in any
immediate danger, the required time period for abandonment could be
lengthened to two years, which is twice as long as any period required
by existing termination or adoption statutes, yet safely beyond the
point at which the abandonment will have become permanent in the
186
child's mind.
The second prong, requiring a showing that termination is in
the child's best interests, would incorporate the constitutional
"presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children" 187 with the existing standards of "suitability."188 Rather
than imposing the court's judgment on the desirability of terminating
the absent parent's rights, the court would afford deference to the
present parent's judgment that termination is in the best interests of
the child. 189 Courts should recognize that the present parent has been
and will continue to be in the child's life daily, experiencing the child's
joys and sorrows, witnessing the child's personality develop, and
observing the child's emotional needs. 190
The present parent is
thereby in the best position to assess the child's best interests. 191 The
court, on the other hand, has minimal exposure to or knowledge of the
individual child and is consequently limited to generalizations,
predictions, and often, a particular judge's personal parenting
judgments. 92 While it would be appropriate for the court to assess
provide father with current address so he could exercise visitation); and In re Lambert, 545 So.
2d 1122, 1123 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (for determination of "just cause," "[i]f the parent alleges lack
of employment, he must prove that he was not only unemployed but unemployable.").
186. See supra notes 45-47, 56-57 and accompanying text for the time requirements included
in existing termination and adoption statutes. For discussion of "the Child's Sense of Time," see
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 41-42, 44-45.
187. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
188. See supra notes 16, 149.
189. Compare cases cited supra notes 77, 83, (refusing such actions based upon the court's
judgment of the best interests of the children and good public policy), with Troxel, 530 U.S. at 7273 ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision
could be made.").
190. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 24-25.
191. Buss, supra note 1, at 649 ("Because the parent knows herself, her child, and her entire
household better than the state knows them, and stands in a position of greater influence than
the state over the behavior of all three, the parent is best situated to decide what private
relationships should be fostered.").
192. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 47-48 ("[It is beyond the competence of
any judge, or the competence of any discipline for that matter, to appraise the amalgam of
human factors in any child placement dispute for purposes of making long-term predictions or
dictating special conditions for custody."); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 91 ("The legal
system has neither the resources nor the sensitivity to respond to a growing child's ever-
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whether a parent is seeking the termination in good faith, absent
dishonorable motivations, courts should accept a present parent's
request for termination as a compelling indication that such a result
193
would be in the child's best interests.
The next inquiry of the "best interests" prong would be into the
suitability of the present parent to be the child's sole legal parent.
This determination would involve an assessment of whether the
parent is financially and emotionally capable of supporting the child
alone. 194 At this point, the court could appropriately address the
state's interest in not having to support the child in the future without
the option of pursuing the absent parent for child support. 19 5 The
present parent would have to demonstrate that his or her current
financial resources and future earning potential are sufficient to
support and educate the child at least through the age of majority. 196
The court could also assess the child's adjustment to and well-being in
the single-parent environment. 97 Consistent with state policy, it may
be appropriate for the court to appoint a guardian ad litem or child
psychiatrist to represent the child and report to the court regarding
the child's current well-being.'9 8 At the end of the inquiry, however, if

changing needs and demands. It does not have the capacity to deal on an individual basis with
the consequences of its decisions ....); id. at 93-94; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 93, at 160
("[T]hey have a multitude of personal beliefs and ordinary knowledge about what is good and bad
for children and about what makes a satisfactory or unsatisfactory parent; beliefs and knowledge
which they, as adults moved by an urge to 'rescue' children, are tempted to impose. The risk that
actions and decisions in child placement will rest on personal values presented in the guise of
professional knowledge is therefore great-and all the more important to guard against."); Buss,
supra note 1, at 647 ("In contrast [to a parent], the state's knowledge of and commitment to any
particular child is relatively thin.").
193. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe
on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a 'better' decisions could be made."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ('The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children."); DOWD, supra note 18, at 116 ("We should trust the choices of
adults as most beneficial for them and their children."); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 89
("To be an adult who is a parent is therefore to be presumed by law to have the capacity,
authority, and responsibility to determine and to do what is 'good' for one's children, what is
'best' for the entire family.").
194. See supra notes 16, 149 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 149.
197. See supra note 142 for discussion of the different effects a single-parent household can
have on a child and research revealing that, absent economic strain, children may actually fare
better in single-parent homes.
198. Forty-six states currently require the appointment of a guardian ad litem in
termination of parental rights actions. Haugaard & Avery, supra note 10, at 138. For discussion
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the parent is "financially, physically, and mentally able to have
permanent custody of the child" 199 and the child is thriving under the
sole care of the present parent, termination should be presumed to be
in the child's best interests, absent extraordinary and compelling
reasons to the contrary.
3. Procedural Requirements
Consistent with the Due Process Clause, the proposed statute
would necessarily provide the absent parent with all of the procedural
safeguards afforded in any proceeding resulting in the termination of
parental rights. 20 0 The absent parent would be provided with notice
and the opportunity to be heard, and allegations of abandonment
20 1
would have to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Consistent with state practice, states could further provide the absent
20 2
parent with the right to counsel.
4. Effect
Upon finding that an absent parent has abandoned his or her
child and that termination of that parent's rights is in the child's best
interests, a final judgment would enter completely and permanently
terminating the absent parents' parental rights and responsibilities.
Specifically,
[u]pon the termination of parental rights ...all rights, powers, privileges, immunities,
duties, and obligations, including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support
existing between the child and parent shall be severed and terminated and the parent
shall have no standing to appear at any further legal proceedings concerning the
203
child.

Aside from the absent parent's right to appeal, the judgment
would be permanent and irreversible. 20 4 The absent parent would be

of the role a guardian ad litem or child psychiatrist would play in such a proceeding, see
Johnson, supra note 16, at 403.
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3(a) (1999) (suitability standard for an adopting parent).
200. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 753-54 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 649, 657 (1972).
201. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48, 753-54; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649, 657.
202. While a parent does not have an automatic right to counsel in a termination of parental
rights proceeding, STEIN, supra note 16, at 154, forty-six states provide parents with the right to
counsel. Haugaard & Avery, supranote 10, at 138.
203. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.200(1) (West 1993).
204. For the general finality of such orders, and the parent's right to appeal, see, for
example, CAL. FAM. CODE § 7894(b)-(c) (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-63 (Michie
1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.110 (Michie 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-293 (1998); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 128.120 (Michie 1998).
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divested of any residual rights to petition for visitation, object to the
present parent's relocation, access the child's personal files, or in any
other way interfere with the child's upbringing. 2 5 Conversely, all of
the present parent's preexisting parental rights would remain fully
intact and, contrary to the reasoning in previous legal decisions, would
be strengthened, expanded, and transformed. All obligations to notify
the court and the absent parent of major parental decisions would
cease, as would the court's jurisdiction to modify the parent's rights
upon any change of circumstances. The present parent would gain the
power to designate a legal guardian for the child in his or her will.
The present parent would truly have the exclusive right "to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of [his or her
child] ."206 The present parent would become the sole parent.
V. CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, every child would receive love, care, and
support from both natural parents. As we all know, however, this
world is far from perfect, and the common make-up of families is
rapidly changing.
Current research indicates that approximately
thirty percent of American children, or 18 million, live in single-parent
families. 20 7 Of these children, somewhere between thirty and forty
percent, or approximately 6.3 million, have been essentially
abandoned by the other parent. 20 8 The remaining family units,
consisting of present parents and the children they care for,
necessarily face unique emotional and financial challenges. The
question is whether the law should seek to minimize these challenges
by offering full recognition and autonomy to these family units, or
whether it will continue to restrict and interfere with their autonomy.
This Note has set forth a multitude of ways the law seeks to
guarantee privacy and autonomy to recognized family units. It has
also identified the ways in which the law limits the rights of one very
prevalent family unit: the present parent family. The essential
argument set forth is merely that the law should afford present parent
families the same autonomy currently afforded to two-parent families
and adoptive families.
The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that present parents' rights are fundamental liberties

205. Compare the rights associated with custody as set forth in supra Part III.B with the
"fresh start" approach set forth in Fuller, supra note 93, at 1188, 1193-94.
206. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
207. GREIF, supra note 18, at 4.
208. See supra note 18.
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deserving the utmost constitutional protection. 209 The Court has also
recognized that absent parents, who fail to assume adequate parental
responsibilities, are not entitled to constitutional protection. 210 State
laws have responded by severing parental rights where a parent has
failed to communicate with, visit, or support his or her child for a
prolonged period of time. 21 1 State laws have also responded by
granting adoptive parents, including single parents, full rights in their
adoptive children. 212 The inconsistency and inequality that remains is
the legal rights afforded to present natural parents: custody.
This void must be filled. Custody is simply not suited for the
situation in which one parent goes and the other parent stays.
Present parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their
children as they see fit, safe from undue state interference. The
children they raise have a compelling interest in a stable and loving
home that is free from harmful intrusions. Absent parents ladk any
constitutional right to object to or interfere with the present parents'
autonomy. All this being said, it seems only logical that present
parents should be afforded a legal means by which to attain full
parental rights in the children they raise.
Wendee M Hilderbrand*

209. See supra Part II.A.1.
210. See supra Part II.A.2.
211. See supra Part II.B.
212. See supra notes 145, 158, 167, and accompanying text.
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supporting all of my aspirations, and showing me the kind of attorney I want to become. Your
last request of me was to send you a copy of this Note; I regret that I am unable to do so. I just
hope that, somehow, it finds its way to you.
I also dedicate this Note to my daughter Savannah, who has inspired this piece, my career,
and my life. None of this would be possible without her smile and her love. I further dedicate
this Note to my dear friend Bruce, who is the strongest, most noble single father I have ever
known, and to all of the other parents who endure the trials detailed herein and triumph because
of the extraordinary love they have for their children. I thank my father Jerry for taking
ownership in my dreams. And finally, I humbly thank all of my editors for their time and efforts.

